As science reaches further into the cognitive domain, questions once thought firmly outside the realm of science are becoming subjects of scientific inquiry. One of the foremost challenges is the relationship of our thoughts and intentions to the world we study and manipulate. Once thought intractable, this problem seems newly open to scientific discovery. Neurological correlates of many cognitive functions are being discovered, yielding advances in medicine and education. The growth of artificial intelligence raises the possibility that intelligent behavior can be understood scientifically, formalized, and engineered into intelligent devices. Yet the problem of free will eludes our grasp. We have the distinct sense that we make choices, and those choices have effects. The world is different from what it would have been had we chosen otherwise. But could we really have chosen otherwise, or are the choices we make determined by the electrochemistry of our brains? This paper examines a proposed theory of a physical basis for efficacious free choice, and asks whether it can be operationalized as a concrete, falsifiable model. The hypothesized mechanism involves automatic generation by the brain of templates for action, which are held in place by rapidly repeated quantum self-measurement events. A computer simulation of this model could support investigation of whether, using biologically plausible parameter settings, the hypothesized mechanism can produce macroscopic behavioral effects. Ultimately, such investigations could lead to empirical tests of the theory.
Introduction
How do our thoughts and intentions relate to the world we contemplate and manipulate? Through the ages, this question has generated fascination, perplexity and heated debate. Advances in the cognitive sciences are providing new insights into this age-old question. Neuroimaging studies are improving our understanding of the neural correlates of various kinds of conscious experience. Psychophysical measurements provide data to inform models of information processing. Computational models simulate theories of sensory, cognitive and motor processing and evaluate their fit to empirical data. Intelligent computer systems perform at or near human levels on many tasks. Robots drive autonomously, support bedridden patients, and perform repetitive or dangerous tasks in factories (e.g., Royakkers and Est, 2015) . A goal that had long seemed out of reach, to understand how our minds perceive and act on the world, seems to be drawing ever closer.
As our understanding of neuroscience and cognition grows, the puzzle of free will remains as intractable as ever. That we experience free will is undeniable. We see ourselves as agents choosing actions we desire and implementing them in the physical world. As we face a decision, we feel strongly that our choice will determine which option is realized in the physical world. After making our decision, we feel we could have chosen otherwise, and if so, the world would have been different. Yet it is unclear how this feeling of agency can be reconciled with physical models of our brains and bodies. Most neurological and physiological models are based on classical physics, a deterministic theory. What does it mean to say we could have chosen other than we did, if the behavior of our bodies is a deterministic consequence of the laws of physics and the external forces acting on us? Adding a stochastic component to neurophysiological models is of no help -agents make intentional choices, not random ones.
Is our sense of agency real, or is it an illusion? If it is real, then how can it be reconciled with established and validated neurophysiological models of how our brains and bodies work? Is there a way, consistent with the laws of physics, for the intentional choices of agents to make a difference in how the physical world evolves?
The following properties are proposed as criteria for a theory of efficacious free choice to be consistent with commonsense ideas of agency:
1. Freedom. The theory should contain a construct representing choices made by agents. The choices should be free in that there are multiple allowable possibilities. The choice of which is enacted should be ascribed to the agent. 2. Efficaciousness. The elements representing free choices should be efficacious in the sense that they cause predictable effects in the physical world that would have been different had the agents chosen otherwise. In addition, the theory should cohere with established and validated laws of physics:
3. Physicality. The theory should be consistent with our knowledge of how the physical world works, as expressed by the laws of physics. The basic conundrum of free will is the seeming inconsistency among these three properties. Deterministic models based on classical physics violate the requirement that multiple choices are allowable. Models in which agents behave randomly violate the requirement that outcomes are predictable consequences of choices made by agents.
If both deterministic and stochastic models are ruled out, then what remains? Stapp( , 2011 Stapp( , 2017 argues that quantum theory can be interpreted as a rationally coherent theory satisfying the above three properties of freedom, efficaciousness and physicality. Stapp's interpretation contains constructs explicitly representing the choices of agents. The choices of agents in Stapp's interpretation have predictable causal impacts on the physical world. Furthermore, Stapp's theory is entirely consistent with physical law.
Stapp's theory of efficacious free choice is discussed in detail in later sections. Section 2 discusses mainstream scientific and philosophical views of cognition and behavior, and argues against their adequacy as models of free choice. Section 3 provides constructs for representing and analyzing cause and effect relationships. Section 4 gives an overview of the basics of quantum theory, and shows that von Neumann's orthodox formulation of quantum theory can be represented as a causal theory in which measurements correspond to interventions, which Stapp ascribes to agents, that cause predictable effects on the physical world. Section 5 proposes the quantum Zeno effect as a mechanism for using measurements to control the behavior of a quantum system.
Given a physically grounded theory of free and efficacious choice, applying it to free choice in humans requires that it satisfy two additional properties:
4. Representation. There must be some way, consistent with known principles of neuroscience, for agents to form representations of the world that enable them to predict the effects of the choices available to them and to assess the relative desirability of different options. 5. Implementation. There must be some way, consistent with known principles of physiology, for agents to enact their choices to cause their bodies to behave as intended. Significant work remains to connect Stapp's ideas in a concrete way to neuroscience models and to generate empirical predictions to evaluate the theory. As a first step in this direction, Section 6 discusses the instantiation of Stapp's proposed mechanism in brains. Section 7 sketches a more detailed model in which the quantum Zeno effect might be employed to reinforce or disrupt entrainment of synchronous oscillations in the brain. Computer simulation is proposed to investigate the biological plausibility of the model. Section 8 concludes with a discussion and suggestions for future work.
Thinking and Acting in the Physical World
The study of biological mentality has both borrowed from and contributed to the field of artificial intelligence, the discipline devoted to engineering intelligence into physical devices. The connection between the physical and mental aspects of the world lies at the very core of artificial intelligence. Newell and Simon (1976) theorized that intelligence is a property of physical symbol systems. These are systems that manipulate physical patterns called symbols, combine them into evolving symbol structures, use them to designate objects in the external world, and interpret them to act in the world. Newell and Simon hypothesized that "a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for intelligent action." Though the physical symbol system hypothesis is much debated, physical symbol systems underlie much of artificial intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 2009) .
Reviewing criticisms of the physical symbol system hypothesis, Nilsson (2007) concluded that physical symbols are undeniably necessary but may need to be combined with non-symbolic processing to achieve true intelligence. The most common models for non-symbolic processing are connectionist models, also known as artificial neural networks (e.g., Bishop, 1996; Walter and Schulten, 1993) . Inspired by the biological neural networks found in animal brains, an artificial neural network consists of many highly interconnected processing units called artificial neurons that process information by transmitting signals across weighted connections. In a process called spreading activation, an artificial neuron computes its activation level by aggregating the signals it receives, and then uses its activation level to determine the output it sends to other artificial neurons. A popular information processing rule, in analogy to biological neurons, is that an artificial neuron "fires", or sends a signal, when its activation level exceeds its activation threshold.
Symbolic, connectionist and hybrid models have achieved great practical success in robotics and artificial intelligence, and have led to insights into cognition in humans and other animals. Nielson's view that both symbolic and non-symbolic processing are necessary for intelligence has become the mainstream view in both artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
Both the physical symbol systems of Newell and Simon and standard connectionist models are founded on classical physics. The dominant worldview underlying classical physics is materialism, also called physicalism. Materialism holds that reality is material in its fundamental nature, and experiences are aspects of the physical brain. If all that exists is material, and if our minds are but an aspect of our deterministically evolving material bodies, the question arises of why subjective experience exists at all. This has been called the "hard problem" (Chalmers 1995) of consciousness, as contrasted with the "easy problem" of identifying the neural correlates associated with various mental processes. Artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology and neuroscience have made strides toward addressing the easy problem, with many concomitant benefits to fields such as medicine, education and engineering. A solution to the hard problem remains elusive.
Some materialists have argued that Chalmers carves the problem of experience at unnatural seams (Dennett, 1996) , and the hard problem will evaporate once our intuitions have been trained by advances in cognitive neuroscience (Dehaene, 2104, p. 262) . Chalmers believes that solving the hard problem requires taking experience as a fundamental property of nature subject to its own fundamental laws. Because he considers mind to be an aspect of nature apart from matter, Chalmers is a dualist and not a materialist. He calls his dualism "innocent," in that it is entirely compatible with existing physical theory. He proposes augmenting physics with "further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes" (Chalmers, 1995) . Chalmers argues that subjective experience arises from the brain's electrochemical processes in some as yet to be defined way, but does not affect the behavior of the material world in any way.
While materialists and Chalmers-style dualists disagree on whether subjective experiences are brain states or arise from brain states, most contemporary scientists agree that the behavior of our brains and bodies can be explained by classical physical theory. Nevertheless, the determinism of classical physics seems hard to reconcile with our unshakeable sense that there are situations in which we can choose among options and the choices we make are, at least within limits, up to us.
Consider an example. Suppose you are sitting in a chair, as shown in Figure 1 , and you notice a glass of water on a nearby table. Feeling a bit thirsty, you contemplate walking over to the table and picking up the glass. You decide to carry out your plan, and then do as you had planned. Having picked up the glass, you cannot help but feel that it was physically possible for you to have chosen to stay seated. If you had made this very possible-seeming choice, you feel, the world would have been different. The glass would still be on the table. It is difficult to imagine that this counterfactual is not genuine. You have the distinct sense that it was physically possible for the world to have been different from how it is, and it was your physically unconstrained choice that caused the world to be as it is rather than as it could have been.
Figure 1. Choosing to Pick Up an Object
There is an extensive literature grappling with the question of whether and how free will can be reconciled with determinism (cf. Coates and McKenna, 2015) . The debate has yielded no consensus. Most scientists either ignore the debate or relegate it to cocktail-hour conversations. For the most part, the boundaries between disciplines and the structure of research programs reinforce this tendency. Physical scientists and hardware engineers stick to the workings of physical devices. Psychologists devote themselves to modeling mental phenomena. The computer metaphor is useful for constructing theories of mental processes, but how those mental processes connect with the physical world is outside the purview of computational theories. This partitioning has been quite useful for allowing scientists and engineers to go about the business of inventing new technology such as medical assistance devices (Hawkins, 2017) , driverless cars (Claudel and Ratti, 2015) , factory robots (Shneier and Bostelman, 2015) and even brain-computer interfaces (Vansteensel et al., 2016) . The debate about what is really going on at the boundary between the mental and the physical is regarded as intractable in the near term and perhaps ultimately unsolvable. The hard problem is treated as a philosophical puzzle, not a legitimate topic for science.
Notably, the classical physics on which most cognitive theories are founded has been superseded by quantum physics. Quantum physics replaces the determinism of classical physics with a stochastic element. Early quantum physicists regarded the stochastic nature of the theory with consternation, as evidenced by Einstein's famous remark that God does not play dice. Some interpretations of quantum theory attempt to explain away the stochasticity, but none has been entirely successful.
Meanwhile, appreciation is growing in the artificial intelligence community that a bit of randomness can actually improve a system's performance on complex tasks. Some of the most successful intelligent systems use randomness to ensure adequate search of the space of possible solutions and to avoid becoming stuck at inferior solutions (e.g., Andrieu, et al, 2003; Howard, 2006) . While researchers in cognitive science and artificial intelligence acknowledge the utility of randomness for models of intelligence, most view quantum theory as irrelevant to cognition and decision-making. Stochastic models existed prior to the advent of quantum theory, and most random algorithms use deterministic pseudorandom number generators rather than true quantum randomizers. Quantum theory is widely regarded as unnecessary for theories of neuroscience, cognition or artificial intelligence.
Another factor contributing to the dismissal of quantum theory is that it is typically applied to microscopic systems such as elementary particles, whereas conscious deliberation and decision-making seem macroscopic in nature. While the possibility is acknowledged that quantum randomness could be amplified to the macroscopic level through chaotic processes, explicitly introducing quantum theory into models of cognition and robotics is generally thought to be unnecessary.
Even if quantum randomness were shown to play an important role in cognition, it would be of little help to a theory of free will. Random processes are unpredictable and uncontrollable. Free will requires predictability and control. Replacing determinism with randomness leaves the agent with no means of making intentional choices predicted to bring about desired consequences.
These dismissals notwithstanding, the advent of quantum theory has made it more difficult for physicists to stay on their preferred side of the boundary between the physical and the mental (Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2011) . From the outset, the developers of quantum theory found themselves forced to bring the observer's knowledge and the experimenter's free choices into the language used to describe the theory. While the mathematical apparatus of quantum theory is undisputed, and the match between experiment and prediction is stunningly accurate, the question of what the equations are really saying about the world remains the subject of controversy. Mainstream physics and engineering have largely adopted a "shut up and calculate" attitude (Mermin, 1989 ) that has enabled rapid technological advance, but leaves the problem of free will unaddressed.
Drawing on the foundational work of von Neumann (1932 Neumann ( /1955 ) and Wigner (1961) , Stapp (2011; argues that the informal language about observers' free choices should be taken seriously. A realistic interpretation of quantum theory, argues Stapp, provides an opening for a physically realistic model of free will. The mathematical structure of quantum theory, when realistically interpreted as described by Stapp, allows the intentional choices of agents to have a causal impact on the physical world.
Causes and Effects
For free will to be efficacious, our actions must cause the physical world to change in ways we can predict with at least some degree of certainty. This section considers a formal theory of what it means to have a causal impact. In his seminal book on causality, Pearl (2009a Pearl ( , 2009b argues that philosophical confusion and lack of a formal mathematical foundation have impeded our ability to think scientifically about cause and effect relationships. Reliance on intuition to draw causal conclusions from data creates the potential for bias and error. Pearl's structural theory of causation subsumes and unifies other major formulations of causation. It provides a formal language for formulating causal statements, a logically coherent foundation for analyzing causal claims, and a set of mathematical tools for answering common types of causal queries.
A causal claim is stronger than a claim of statistical association. Demonstrating causation requires showing not only that an association exists, but also that it is preserved under interventions that do not disturb the causal connection (Woodward, 2005) . To illustrate, consider two examples of statistical association, only one of which is causal. The first, a commonly cited example of spurious association, is between ice cream sales and deaths by drowning. The relationship arises because a common cause, high temperature, causes both ice cream sales and drowning deaths to increase. The second example is between smoking and lung cancer. Although today the association is universally acknowledged to be causal, it was hotly disputed at one time. Sir Ronald Fisher, father of modern statistics and confirmed pipe smoker, famously argued in 1957 that public health warnings about the health effects of tobacco were "but the organized creation of states of frantic alarm." He argued that, like the ice cream and drowning example, a common cause might be driving both an increase in smoking and an increase in lung cancer deaths. He suggested a genetic predilection for smoking as a candidate.
It is clear today that the relationship is spurious in the first example and causal in the second. How can this intuition be investigated scientifically? Suppose we can intervene to manipulate ice cream sales in a manner that does not disturb any mechanisms related to drowning deaths (e.g., through advertising or price manipulation). In the case of a causal relationship, we should see a change in the rate of deaths by drowning; in the case of a spurious relationship, we should see no such change.
Pearl's do-calculus is a mathematical formalization of the idea that causal relationships are stable under this kind of external intervention. According to Pearl, a causal model consists of a joint probability distribution over a set of variables, together with a set of "local surgery" rules that specify the effects of intervening to set the states of some of the variables to specified values. The surgery rules amount to cutting the links from other causes of a manipulated variable so that their effects are nullified. This allows the variable's value to be specified freely via external manipulation, while leaving other relationships in the model undisturbed.
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows graphical probability models for two hypotheses about the relationship between ice cream sales and drowning deaths: one causal and the other spurious. Both models make the same predictions for co-occurrence of ice cream sales and drowning deaths, but differ in their predictions about the effects of interventions. The Do(Ice Cream Sales = s) operation breaks the link between ice cream sales and its intrinsic causes (temperature in Figure 2b ; not shown in Figure 2a ), and sets sales to a value chosen by the experimenter. The result of this local surgery is a new probability distribution that differs from the original one in that ice cream sales have the value s, whereas all other parts of the model remain undisturbed. In the model of Figure 2a , applying the Do(Ice Cream Sales = s) operator will affect the probability distribution of deaths by drowning; in Figure 2b , there will be no change to the probability distribution of drowning deaths.
Figure 2. Causal and Spurious Association Hypotheses
Empirical evidence could be gathered to distinguish between these hypotheses. For example, experimenters might intervene to change ice cream sales in a set of locales and observe data on drowning deaths. Results from such a study would undoubtedly disconfirm the causal hypothesis. That is, in a well-designed study that controlled for confounding factors, experimentally manipulated ice cream sales and drowning deaths would almost certainly show no greater than chance association, thus favoring the hypothesis that the association is spurious. For the case of smoking and lung cancer, by contrast, the causal hypothesis was controversial at one time, but has become universally accepted because of overwhelming evidence that interventions to change smoking behavior have effects on cancer rates (Garfinkel and Silverberg 1991 ). Pearl's structural theory of causation provides a general set of tools for inferring causal relationships from a combination of data and assumptions, for predicting the effects of interventions, and for drawing inferences about counterfactuals.
The next section introduces the orthodox von Neumann interpretation of quantum theory and shows that it can be formulated as a causal theory in which measurement events are represented as external interventions. Section 5 shows that these interventions can be exploited to cause predictable changes in the evolution of a quantum system.
Quantum Theory and the Measurement Problem
Before introducing a model of mind-body interaction, this section provides a brief overview of the basics of quantum theory. The mathematical rules of quantum theory and its predictions for the outcomes of experiments are well established, but the interpretation of the theory is vigorously disputed. The interpretation presented in most textbooks, called the Copenhagen interpretation, is attributed to Niels Bohr and named after the city in which his institute was located. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, there are two distinct ways in which a quantum system evolves over time: (1) unitary evolution according to the Schrödinger equation, and (2) an instantaneous and discontinuous change in state called reduction of the state, or more picturesquely, collapse. Unitary evolution occurs when the system is isolated from its environment; reduction occurs when the system interacts with a measuring instrument and produces a classically observable measurement outcome. Von Neumann (1932 Neumann ( /1955 presented a rigorous mathematical formulation of the rules of quantum theory. He gave the name Process 1 to reduction and Process 2 to unitary evolution. In Process 1, the quantum system undergoes an instantaneous stochastic transition to one of a set of possible outcome states. The prior state together with the set of possible outcome states determine well-defined probabilities for which outcome will occur. The rule for calculating these probabilities is called the Born rule after the physicist Max Born. A large body of experimental evidence confirms the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory to exceptional accuracy.
Quantum theory is incomplete in that neither the timing of Process 1 events nor the set of possible outcomes is specified by the theory. Empirically, we observe that collapse occurs when a quantum system interacts with its environment. Specifically, collapses are associated with measurements that produce an observable change in a macroscopic measurement device. Because reductions are associated with measurements, the lack of a theory for state reduction has been called the measurement problem. The essence of the measurement problem is this: the behavior of a quantum system depends in macroscopically distinguishable ways on an aspect of the world about which the orthodox theory has nothing to say. A scientist can choose which of several distinct macroscopic effects to actualize by choosing which aspects of the system to observe. That is, quantum theory contains a contingent element. It specifies behavior of the system given the choices made by an agent external to the theory, but it makes no predictions about which choices the external agent will make.
Some have argued that a phenomenon called environmental decoherence (Zurek, 2002) resolves the measurement problem and obviates the need for von Neumann's Process 1. Like reductions, decoherence occurs when a quantum system interacts with its environment. Decoherence destroys an inherently quantum mechanical property called interference. The prototypical example of interference is the famous double slit experiment, in which an atomic particle is shot through a barrier with two closely spaced narrow slits at a screen that detects when particles impinge upon it. If the particles were classical, we could find the probability distribution for detections using standard classical probability calculations. We would determine the probability that the particle went through each of the slits, find the distribution of detections if it went through each slit, and combine these into an overall probability distribution. When there is quantum interference, this calculation gives incorrect results. The probability distribution of detections exhibits a pattern reminiscent of a wave splitting into two components that recombine and interfere with each other. The interference pattern is sometimes called a probability wave. Crests of the probability wave have a high probability of detection and troughs have a low probability of detection. When a quantum system is coupled to its environment, interactions with the environment destroy the interference pattern. The crests and troughs disappear, and the classical probability calculations apply. That is, a quantum system that is not isolated from its environment behaves to very close approximation like a collection of classical alternative possible states, each with an associated probability.
Although environmental decoherence destroys interference patterns, it does not solve the problem of definite outcomes (Adler, 2003) . Decoherence produces a state that can be described mathematically as a mixture, i.e., a set of classical-like alternative outcomes with a probability for each. But we experience a single actual outcome, not a probability mixture of many possible outcomes. Over repeated trials, the frequencies of actual outcomes will match the probabilities, but each measurement event results in a single outcome. Joos (1999) says, "What decoherence tells us is that certain objects appear classical when observed. But what is an observation? At some stage we still have to apply the usual probability rules of quantum theory." That is, decoherence does not provide a means to pick out a definite outcome from the collection of possibilities.
The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett, 1957 ) addresses the measurement problem by denying that there are definite outcomes. Quantum systems undergo only unitary evolution; there are no reductions. At every quantum event, the universe splits into different worlds containing the different possible outcomes of the event. Because decoherence yields classical-like worlds, observers (or measuring devices) in each world are in well-defined correspondence with classical-seeming outcomes. That is, the observers in each world see each quantum event as having a single outcome. The other possible outcomes occur in their own worlds with their own observers.
The many worlds interpretation has generated intense debate, with strong proponents and equally strong detractors. At present, the debate between many worlds and collapse theories remains in the metaphysical realm. Both make the same empirical predictions for currently achievable experiments. It has been claimed that they are indistinguishable in principle (e.g., Vaidman, 2016) , but others argue that sufficiently advanced technology would lead to empirical tests.
Like any deterministic theory, many worlds quantum theory is difficult to reconcile with free will. Specifically, the many worlds interpretation does not satisfy the criterion of freedom as described in Section 1. Although there are multiple allowable possibilities for each quantum event, no choices are actually made. All possibilities actually occur, each in its own world. Each quantum event spawns a collection of branches, one for each outcome. The observers in each branch experience the outcome that occurs in that branch.
Absent empirical confirmation of one interpretation over another, it is premature for science to commit to any particular interpretation as correct. On the other hand, a "shut up and calculate" attitude that eschews interpretation inhibits the kind of deep, creative thought required to devise empirical tests. Eventually, such creative thought may bear fruit in empirical evidence for an existing interpretation, or perhaps a new theory not yet devised. For now, continued exploration of the implications of different interpretations is a promising path to devising such empirical tests. Toward that end, this paper examines a realistic interpretation of von Neumann's mathematical formulation, shows that it satisfies the three criteria of freedom, efficaciousness and physicality, and suggests a path toward developing it into a viable theory of human free choice satisfying the criteria of representation and viability.
The founders of quantum theory emphasized that when to take a measurement and what to measure must be left as free choices of the scientist. If measurements are ascribed to the free choice of agents, then quantum theory becomes a probabilistic causal theory in the sense of Pearl (Laskey, 2007) . To see this, consider a quantum system prepared in a known initial state, subjected to unitary evolution for a fixed time period of length T, and then measured. Let {  ,   , ……   } be a set of different kinds of measurement that can be applied to the system, each having a different set of possible outcomes. Orthodox quantum theory stipulates that the scientist has free choice of which operator to apply. That is, the scientist can perform the Do(Measurement = M) operation (Figure 3) to select what to measure. The choice of M is left to the scientist's free will. The probability distribution for the state after measurement is obtained by applying Process 2 to the initial state for a time period T, and then using the Born rule to calculate the probability of each of the possible outcomes of M. This probability distribution will be different for different choices of M. That is, the scientist's free choice has a macroscopically distinguishable effect on the probability distribution of the post-measurement state. In other words, according to Pearl's structural theory of causation, measurement has a causal impact on the future state of the system. For simplicity of exposition, the example of Figure 3 considered only the choice of what to measure. The Copenhagen interpretation also assigns the choice of when to make a measurement to the scientist's free will. As discussed in detail in the next section, the choice of timing of measurements also has a causal impact on the state of the system. This causal impact of the timing of reductions plays a fundamental role in Stapp's theory of free will.
That quantum theory's predictions depend on scientists' choice of what to measure has generated consternation among physicists. Indeed, the laboratory environment in which measurement occurs and the body of the scientist doing the measurement are physical systems, and as such should be subject to the laws of quantum theory. Thus, it ought to be possible to formulate quantum measurement within this larger system. Von Neumann set out to formalize this idea. He noted that placement of the boundary between measured and measuring system is in a sense arbitrary. We can consider <Scientist + Instrument> as the measuring system and <Quantum System> as the measured system. Alternatively, we can move the boundary, treating <Scientist> as the measuring system and <Instrument + Quantum System> as the measured system. Moving further, we can place the boundary at the scientist's retina as it absorbs photons reflecting off the measuring instrument. Moving the boundary even further, we can trace the nerve signals traveling from the retina into the scientist's brain, and place the boundary at the brain cells receiving the nerve signals. Finally, says von Neumann, we can place the boundary such that the entire physical world is the measured system and the "abstract ego" of the scientist is the measuring system. Wherever we place the boundary, measurement is associated with an instantaneous and discontinuous change in which a set of possibilities is reduced to one actuality, with probabilities of the different outcomes specified by the Born rule. Formulating the process of measurement within the larger system has not addressed the dynamic incompleteness of quantum theory. We still lack a theory of when and how the discontinuous Process 1 change occurs.
Von Neumann goes on to describe the scientist's subjective perception of the measurement outcome that accompanies the discontinuous Process 1 change. Subjective perception, says von Neumann, is … a new entity relative to the physical environment and is not reducible to the latter. Indeed, subjective perception leads us into the intellectual inner life of the individual, which is extra-observational by its very nature. (von Neumann, 1932 (von Neumann, /1955 Nevertheless, says von Neumann, the brain doing the perceiving is a physical system, and subjective perception must therefore correspond to a characteristic physical state of the brain:
… it is a fundamental requirement of the scientific viewpoint -the so-called principle of psycho-physical parallelism -that it must be possible to describe the extra-physical process of the subjective perception as if it were in reality in the physical world -i.e., to assign to its parts equivalent physical processes in the objective environment … (von Neumann,1932 Neumann, /1955 These passages from von Neumann convey a dualist metaphysical stance. Subjective perception and the physical brain state are described as distinct entities, related through a neural correlate corresponding to each conscious experience. In earlier work, Stapp ( , 2011 ) postulated a von Neumann style interactive dualism. In more recent work (Stapp, 2017) , he argues that reality is more naturally viewed as mind-like than matter-like. Stapp (2017) offers quotes from seminal thinkers such as Schrödinger and Planck in support of this metaphysical view. On the other hand, a materialist might argue against the parallelism principle on the grounds that mind and brain are but different aspects of the same thing. This paper takes no position on the debate over whether subjective experience and the corresponding brain state are different entities or different aspects of the same entity. It also takes no position on whether reality is fundamentally mental, physical or both. Regardless of one's position on these questions, the role of subjective experience in orthodox quantum theory can be framed in terms of Newell and Simon's concept of a physical symbol system. In von Neumann's formulation of measurement, the observer's experience, together with the corresponding state of the observer's brain, designate the object being observed. In a stunning departure from traditional physics, von Neumann brought the mind of the observer squarely into the sights of physical theory. Decades before Newell and Simon introduced the idea of a physical symbol system, von Neumann hypothesized a physical mechanism for how an observer's physical symbol system acquires sensory input about an object it designates. The abrupt change that occurs upon measurement, says von Neumann, is accompanied by a corresponding abrupt change in the observer's subjective perception, bringing the observer's state of knowledge into correspondence with the outcome that occurs.
Further, von Neumann reminds us, we are incapable of perceiving the world directly. We have direct access only to our subjective perceptions. In Newell and Simon's terms, we have direct access to the symbols we experience, but only indirect access to the objects they designate.
…Indeed, experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain (subjective) observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value. (von Neumann, 1932 (von Neumann, /1955 That is, quantum theory provides a way to organize data about our past subjective experiences and to make predictions about future experiences. It can tell us about the nature of the physical world only indirectly, through the effects of the physical world on our subjective experiences.
The founders of quantum theory found this intrusion of mind into physics discomfiting, and made every effort to push these uncomfortable psychological considerations back into the box from which they had escaped (Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2011) . Adherents of the Copenhagen interpretation divide the world into two realms, the macroscopic realm of our everyday life and the microscopic quantum realm. Everything we know about a quantum system is learned through observing the outcomes of Process 1 events, which occur in the macroscopic realm and can be described in classical terms. Process 2 occurs in the microscopic realm and is never directly observed. The Copenhagen interpretation asserts that because we do not have direct access to the microscopic realm, it is meaningless to speculate about what is really going on there. Quantum theory gives us a recipe for calculating probabilities of the outcomes of measurements, but according to Copenhagen, it is fruitless to speculate about what is really happening between measurements or what actually occurs when a measurement is taken.
By observing this strict separation, scientists and engineers can apply the rules of quantum theory to predict the behavior of physical systems. They can acquire a pragmatic empirical understanding of when and how measurement works, and learn to design quantum systems to perform their intended functions. This allows them to do their everyday work without undue concern about philosophical or metaphysical issues associated with measurement. This pragmatic attitude allows technology to progress unencumbered by conundrums such as the role of mind or the problem of free will.
Controlling a Quantum System with the Quantum Zeno Effect
The history of science contains many examples of seemingly intractable puzzles that working scientists learned to avoid, but that contained the seeds of major advances. Stapp (2011 Stapp ( , 2017 regards the measurement problem as just such an opportunity. That the predictions of quantum theory depend on an aspect of reality for which there is no accepted theory is uncomfortable for many physicists, but is viewed by Stapp as an opening for the operation of free will. Von Neumann pointed to measurement as an interface between the psychological and the physical aspects of nature. The Copenhagen interpretation ascribes the measurement decision to the free choice of the scientist. Stapp argues that it is no accident that the language scientists use to describe quantum theory makes explicit mention of observers' free choices. Complementary explanatory gaps in physics and psychology are filled by allowing an interaction between the informational structure represented by the quantum state and the subjective conscious experience of observers. Stapp argues that such an interaction allows consciousness to become efficacious without disturbing any of the precepts or rules of quantum theory.
Interpretations of quantum theory that ascribe reductions to consciousness are viewed as unsatisfactory by many. A common criticism is the lack of specificity as to what constitutes consciousness. Can a cat cause a reduction? A bird? A cockroach? Another concern is what happened before conscious organisms evolved. Were there no collapses before there was life?
Although full answers to these questions await further theoretical developments, for the present purpose, it suffices to hypothesize that the universe contains subsystems capable of causing reductions. Such systems might be called reducing agents (Laskey, 2006) because they possess a kind of agency which they can use to cause reductions. A reducing agent is assumed to have a physical state localized to some region in space and time, and to be capable of causing reductions to some part of its physical state (e.g., to the controller for its motor system). Reducing agents can choose, within as yet to be determined physical limits, when to initiate reductions and what kind of reductions to initiate. There need be no assumption that humans are the only kind of reducing agents, or that reducing agents must be fully conscious. It is conceivable that some property akin to consciousness has always existed throughout the universe, and was able to initiate collapses prior to the emergence of life. This idea is consistent with McFadden's (2000) hypothesis that the ability to initiate collapses may have contributed to the evolution of life on Earth.
If the only effect of introducing reducing agents were to replace determinism with randomness, it would be of little help for a theory of free will. To have free will, an agent must be able both to predict which choice will lead to better outcomes, and to control its body to execute the preferred choice. Randomness is neither predictable nor controllable. If free will manifests through the ability to initiate collapses, there must be some way to use collapses to produce results the reducing agent desires.
Stapp hypothesizes that free will enters not through the random outcomes of reductions, but through their timing, which the founders of quantum theory explicitly ascribed to the free choice of experimenters. Through a feature of quantum theory known as the quantum Zeno effect (Misra and Sudarshan, 1977) , the timing of reductions can be exploited to control the evolution of a quantum system. Specifically, performing very rapid measurements on a quantum system can slow its evolution, in effect "freezing" it in place. The quantum Zeno effect has been confirmed experimentally (Patil, et al., 2015) .
To understand how the quantum Zeno effect works, consider a simple example in which a system is measured and outcome A is observed. The system is then allowed to evolve undisturbed for a period of time, at which point the measurement is repeated. Figure 4 shows the probability of obtaining the same result A at the second measurement as a function of the time since the last measurement. 1 The horizontal axis shows the time since the original measurement. The height of the graph at a given time shows the probability of outcome A if the second measurement is taken at that time. The probability begins at 100% and decreases with the time since the original measurement, reaching 50% at time T. The probability decreases slowly at first and more rapidly later. It is this varying rate of decrease that gives rise to the quantum Zeno effect. Now suppose that instead of just two measurements, a sequence of N evenly spaced measurements is taken, with the first measurement at time 0 and the N th measurement at time T. Between measurements, the system undergoes the same time evolution process as before. If N is large, the measurements will be very closely spaced. At the second measurement, taken at time T/N, the probability of obtaining A will be nearly 100%. If the result A occurs, as is very probable, the process resets with a very high and slowly decreasing probability of obtaining A with the next measurement. The third measurement, taken at time 2T/N, will again yield outcome A with very high probability. As before, the process resets with a very high and slowly decreasing probability of obtaining A with the next measurement. Rapidly measuring the system keeps the probability of observing A very high, and keeps the rate of decrease very small. As a consequence, the probability that the result will still be A at time T grows larger as N increases, approaching 100% for large N. Figure 5 illustrates how such rapid measurements can hold a quantum system in place. For different values of N, the graph shows the probability of observing A at time T if the first measurement at time 0 yields outcome A, and N total measurements are taken between 0 and T. 2 The case of N=2, with measurements taken at 0 and T, is the case shown in Figure 4 , with a 50% probability of observing A. As the number of reductions between 0 and T increases, the probability of outcome A at time T increases to near 100%. In other words, rapid measurement "freezes" the system at outcome A.
Figure 4. Probability of Measuring Outcome A as Function of Time
Rapid measurement can also be used to drive a quantum system to a desired state (von Neumann, 1932 /1955 . Because it can be used to accelerate rather than slow down evolution of a quantum system, this phenomenon has been called the inverse quantum Zeno effect (Altenmüller and Schenzle, 1993) . Whereas the quantum Zeno effect involves repeated applications of the same measurement operator, the inverse quantum Zeno 2 Measuring at N evenly spaced intervals of length T/N yields a Markov chain in which |A> transitions to |A> with probability cos 2 T/N; |A> transitions to |B> with probability sin 2 T/N; |B> transitions to |A> with probability sin 2 T/N; and |B> transitions to |B> with probability cos 2 T/N. Figure 5 shows the probability that this Markov chain is in state |A> after the N th measurement given that it started in state |A>. effect uses a sequence of different measurement operators having a sequence of outcomes along a path from the initial to the desired outcome.
If such a sequence of operators is applied in rapid succession, the probability is high that the system will follow the desired path, resulting in the desired state at the end of the process.
Figure 5. Rapid Measurement Holds Quantum System at Same State
The quantum Zeno and inverse quantum Zeno effects demonstrate how the causal openness of quantum physics can be exploited to cause predictable changes in the evolution of a quantum system. It is possible, by choosing the rate at which measurements are taken, to slow down or speed up the evolution of a quantum system. By varying both the measurement operator and the rate of measurement, it is possible to drive a quantum system to a desired state.
Stapp hypothesizes the quantum Zeno effect as the means by which free will operates. If humans are reducing agents with the ability to initiate Process 1 events in our brains, then by applying a rapid sequence of reductions, we can influence the behavior of our bodies in a manner consistent with the laws of quantum theory. Stapp's theory of volition is consistent with existing physical theory. Using the language of Pearl's do-calculus (Figure 3) , the brain of a reducing agent is modeled as a structural causal model. Process 1 events are represented as interventions into the evolution of the brain brought about by free will choices of a reducing agent. As in Pearl's structural theory of causation, reductions are treated as empirically specified, freely chosen interventions. The von Neumann formulation of quantum theory specifies rules for the effects of these interventions, but present-day quantum theory provides no laws for when reductions occur or what operator is applied.
As noted above, quantum theories of mind have been criticized on the grounds that decoherence, which occurs when quantum systems interact with their environments, rapidly destroys quantum effects in the brain. Environmental decoherence does destroy interference patterns, giving rise to a brain state that is approximately a classical statistical mixture. Reduction is still needed to select one actual state out of the many possible states. Georgiev (2015a Georgiev ( , 2015b makes the stronger claim that Stapp's hypothesized mechanism for free will, the quantum Zeno effect, is nullified by environmental decoherence. Stapp (2015) responds by proving that the quantum Zeno effect survives environmental decoherence. He argues on this basis that the quantum Zeno effect could plausibly operate efficaciously in animal brains.
A Theory of How Efficacious Free Choice Manifests in the Brain
A falsifiable scientific theory of mind-body interaction requires a concrete instantiation of the general hypothesis that free will operates via the quantum Zeno effect. Stapp gives some suggestions for how the quantum Zeno effect might manifest in the brain. When preparing to take volitional action, Stapp proposes, a person's brain constructs an action template. This is a pattern of neurological activity that would, if held in place for a sufficient period of time, tend to cause the person's body to execute a given behavioral pattern. Stapp hypothesizes that free will operates by employing a rapid sequence of Process 1 events to hold a desired action template in place longer than it would through the brain's automatic processes.
For example, when you think about reaching for a glass to take a drink, your brain automatically constructs a pattern of activity to initiate bodily movements to reach for and grasp the glass. If you decide to execute the action template, your brain sends signals to your arm that cause your arm to reach toward the glass. As your arm nears the glass, with guided feedback from your eyes, your brain sends signals to your hand to open and then close around the glass. From the time we learned as babies to reach out and grasp, our brains and bodies have fine-tuned this action template, ultimately yielding a well-practiced and smooth sequence of bodily motions. We can execute such action templates with very little conscious attention. The brain contains neurons that process information by receiving, processing and transmitting signals. Each neuron has a cell body or soma, an axon or nerve fiber, and dendrites. The axon is a long fiber that extends from the soma and transmits electrochemical signals to other neurons. Nerve terminals at the end of the axon transmit signals across connections called synapses to dendrites of neighboring neurons, influencing them to fire in a process of spreading activation. The biological neural networks found in mammal brains are far larger and more complex than the artificial neural networks they inspire. Whereas artificial neural networks typically contain hundreds to thousands of neurons, primate brains range from a few hundred million to billions of neurons. The human brain has been estimated to contain about 86 billion neurons (Herculano-Houzel, 2009 ). The biophysical processes by which neurons transmit signals to each other are far more complex than the relatively simple algorithms employed in artificial neural networks. Nevertheless, neural network models similar to those used in robotics and artificial intelligence have been applied to model activity in biological brains (e.g., Güçlü, et al., 2017; Fröhlich and McCormick, 2010) . While these models are extreme simplifications of actual brain processes, they are useful for studying brain processes.
Although there has been some research on quantum neural networks (Manju and Nigam, 2014) , the vast majority of neural network models employed in computing and biology do not make use of quantum theory. Most neuroscientists believe that quantum theory is unnecessary for modeling cognitive processes. Stapp agrees that classical physics is likely to be adequate to model the automatic process by which the brain constructs action templates as we prepare to take volitional action. Where quantum theory is needed, says Stapp, is as a model of volition to choose of one of these automatically arising action templates over another. William James (1892 /1984 said, "The essential achievement of the will...is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind... Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will." Stapp identifies Jamesian "effort of attention" with an ability of the brain to initiate a rapid sequence of Process 1 events on some part of its own state. Effort of attention holds an action template in place longer than it would remain otherwise, thus keeping the brain and body on a path to executing the action sequence it encodes.
For the most part, then, brain dynamics operates to good approximation according to the rules of classical dynamics. According to Stapp, the role of consciousness is to control "attention density," or the rate of occurrence of Process 1 events. Through the quantum Zeno effect or inverse quantum Zeno effect, high attention density holds a desired action template in place, which causes the body to behave in the intended manner.
Stapp's proposal thus counters three major objections to quantum theories of mind. To the argument that decoherence destroys long-range quantum coherence, Stapp responds that that quantum Zeno effect survives decoherence. To the argument that decoherence solves the measurement problem and removes the need for Process 1, Stapp counters that decoherence solves only part of the measurement problem. Decoherence produces a brain state that is well approximated by a statistical mixture of near-classical states, but Process 1 is still needed to select a single possibility out of the statistical mixture. To the objection that replacing determinism with randomness is of no help to a theory of free will, Stapp responds that the quantum Zeno effect provides the predictability and control needed for efficacious free choice. Effort of attention produces a rapid sequence of Process 1 events that maintains execution of the preferred action template.
Any model of free will must account for the pioneering experiments conducted by Libet and his colleagues to examine the neural correlates of conscious decisions (e.g., Libet et al., 1983; Libet, 1985; Libet and Kosslyn, 2005) . Subjects were asked to make an arm movement at a time of their choice. Electroencephalography (EEG) was used to record the rise of readiness potential in subjects' brains. Subjects also watched a clock and noted the time at which they decided to make the movement. Libet found a consistent time lag of about a half second between the time subjects reported becoming aware of their decision and the time at which the readiness potential appeared on the EEG recording. This time lag is a robust finding that has been replicated independently (e.g., Haggard and Eimer, 1999) .
The lag between readiness potential and conscious awareness has been used to argue that free will is an illusion, and our choices are actually generated unconsciously by our brains before we are aware of having chosen (e.g., Wagner, 2003) . Others argue that this interpretation of Libet's findings overstates the evidence (e.g., Mele, 2009 ). Libet himself suggested that the intention to perform an action may begin unconsciously, accompanied by a rise in readiness potential, but that the conscious will could still veto the act prior to its occurrence. In this account, consciousness serves to "select and control volitional outcome" that was initiated unconsciously (Libet, 1985) . The causal nature of the association between rise in readiness potential and the decision to act has also been challenged (e.g., Schurger, et al., 2012) . The results of the Libet experiments are consistent with the model that the brain generates action templates unconsciously, and the role of conscious free will is to hold an action template in place for an action we want to perform.
Stapp hypothesizes that conscious intentions hold action templates in place through application of the quantum Zeno effect. Is this model biologically plausible? If so, where, specifically, in the brain might these quantum effects occur?
Until recently, it was thought that warm temperatures, macroscopic scale, and uncontrolled conditions made quantum theory irrelevant to biological phenomena in general and brain dynamics in particular. This attitude is changing with the discovery that quantum effects are important to biological phenomena such as photosynthesis and avian navigation (Ball, 2011 ). Jedlicka (2017 suggests that quantum effects may be relevant to brain dynamics by speeding microscopic computational processes and by generating quantum fluctuations that the brain's highly nonlinear processing amplifies to the macroscopic level. Ion channels in the brain are being investigated for the possible relevance of quantum effects (e.g., Vaziri and Plenio 2010) . Researchers have suggested that quantum effects may be important to understanding selectivity of ion channels (e.g., Salari, et al., 2015; Salari, et al., 2017; Summhammer, et al., 2012) .
Specifically, Stapp and others (Schwartz, et al., 2005; Stapp, 2017) has suggested ion channels at nerve terminals as a possible locus of quantum uncertainty in the brain. Ion channels are membrane protein complexes that regulate passage of ions through a cell membrane. Ion channels are important in regulating the spreading activation process through which nerve signals travel in the brain. When signals traveling along nerve fibers reach a nerve terminal, calcium ion channels at the nerve terminal open, allowing calcium ions to flow into the nerve terminal. This causes neurotransmitters to be released into the synaptic cleft separating the nerve terminal from the dendrites of a neighboring neuron. This increases the level of activation of the neighboring neuron. When a neuron's activation level increases past its threshold, it fires, causing signals to travel along its axon, opening the ion channels in its nerve terminals and releasing neurotransmitters to activate its neighbors. This process of spreading activation is a fundamental feature of brain dynamics, and is the inspiration for the information processing architecture of artificial neural networks. Passage of calcium ions through ion channels in nerve terminals is a key element in the brain's spreading activation process.
According to Cataldi et al. (2002) , calcium ion channels at nerve terminals are less than 100 nanometers in diameter. This diameter is small enough that the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics becomes relevant. The uncertainty principle is a fundamental limit in the precision with which certain pairs of physical quantities can be measured. As a calcium ion passes through the channel, its spatial dimension is constrained to a very small diameter. Due to the uncertainty principle, this gives rise to uncertainty in its lateral velocity, which in turn leads to uncertainty about whether the ion will be absorbed into the nerve terminal, and consequently to uncertainty about whether neurotransmitter will be released into the synaptic cleft (Schwartz, et al., 2005) .
Several authors have pointed to the electromagnetic field generated by the brain as an important physical correlate of conscious experience (e.g., Pockett, 2000; Stapp, 2009, Ch. 13; McFadden, 2002 McFadden, , 2013 . The distributed, holistic, nonlocal nature of the brain's electromagnetic field makes it an attractive candidate as the locus for consciousness. Consciousness has also been associated with synchronous firing of neurons. McFadden (2013) posits that conscious experience involves a feedback loop in which neuronal firing generates an endogenous electromagnetic field in the brain, which in turn influences the rate and synchronicity of neural firing. He points for empirical support to Fröhlich and McCormick (2010) , who performed a series of in vivo and in vitro experiments to investigate the effects of electric fields, leading them to posit a positive feedback loop that entrains synchronous oscillation in neural networks. Fröhlich and McCormick also constructed a computer simulation of a simple neural network and associated electromagnetic field. Their simulation showed qualitative agreement with the finding that synchronous oscillations are entrained through a feedback loop between the electric field and neural firing. Stapp (2017, Appendix F) , building on the idea that consciousness is associated with electromagnetic oscillations in the brain's electromagnetic field, presents a mathematical model for how the quantum Zeno effect could be used to affect the amplitude of electromagnetic oscillations in the cortex. Rubino, et al. (2006) found oscillations in the beta range in the motor cortex of trained monkeys occurring approximately 100 ms after the monkeys were instructed to move. Citing research on the dimensions of cortical minicolumns (Buxhoeveden and Casanova, 2002) , Stapp argues that beta range oscillations in cortical minicolumns are at the quantum scale. Single frequency oscillations are modeled classically by a simple harmonic oscillator. A quantum harmonic oscillator behaves nearly identically to the classical simple harmonic oscillator, except that the single-point state of the classical harmonic oscillator is replaced by a Gaussian quantum wave packet centered at the simple harmonic oscillator state. Stapp analyzes a 20 Hz quantum oscillator of physical dimension and energy consistent with cortical minicolumns. He concludes that the rate of collapse needed to have a high probability of increasing the amplitude of oscillations via the inverse quantum Zeno effect is a reasonable time scale for a neuroscience.
Simulating QZE in the Brain
Stapp's harmonic oscillator model is very simple and stylized. A natural next step would be to examine whether these results extend to a more neurologically plausible model. Although the Fröhlich and McCormick model includes some stochastic elements, it is not explicitly quantum. It might be possible to build a quantum version of a model like that of Fröhlich and McCormick in a manner similar to how Stapp extended the single-frequency classical oscillator to a quantum oscillator. If consciousness is associated with synchronous oscillations in the electromagnetic field, and synchronous firing of neurons entrains synchronous oscillations in the electromagnetic field, then timing of Process 1 events might be employed to affect this feedback process and thus influence the degree of synchronicity in neural firing. A candidate for these Process 1 events might be quantum uncertainty about whether calcium ions are absorbed at nerve terminals. Process 1 might be employed to nudge the brain toward synchronous firing of neurons associated with an action template the organism intends to effect, or to disrupt synchronous firing and thus interrupt an action template the organism wishes to discontinue.
In summary, a potential neural mechanism for efficacious conscious choice involves a feedback loop in which neural firing generates an electric field, which then entrains synchronous oscillations in the brain's network of neurons. Quantum uncertainty enters through calcium ion channels in the nerve terminals, giving rise to uncertainty in the timing of release of neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft. Conscious free choice operates by producing Process 1 events that select definite outcomes of whether calcium ions are absorbed or not, and hence whether a neurons fire or not. The timing of these Process 1 events is adjusted to reinforce or disrupt entrainment according to the intentions of the mind. This is hypothesized to result in macroscopically distinguishable effects on the organism's behavior.
Consider again the situation depicted in Figure 1 . It is a hot day, you are feeling thirsty, but the glass on the table contains a sugary soft drink and you have resolved to cut down on your sugar intake. As you look across the room at the ice-cold soft drink, you find yourself beginning to get up to walk over and take a drink. If you choose to go forward with this plan, you use attention density to reinforce the synchronous oscillations associated with the action template of walking across the room and drinking from the glass. If you decide to follow your health-conscious resolution, you choose an attention density setting that disrupts the action template, and you settle back into the chair. Either of these choices is physically possible. Which you choose is up to you.
How plausible is this mechanism for how conscious choices affect macroscopic behavior? Investigating this question would require developing the model in much greater detail. One possibility is to extend a model such as that of Fröhlich and McCormick. Recall that their model simulated the feedback between the electrical field and neuron firing. This model could be extended to incorporate quantum uncertainty in the ion channels and the effect of this uncertainty on neural synchronicity. The rate of application of state reductions could be included in the model as an adjustable parameter.
Once such a model was developed, systematic experimentation could be performed to investigate whether different rates of application of Process 1 influence synchronicity of neural firing. In particular, once neurons are firing synchronously, are there rates of application of Process 1 events, i.e., "attention density settings," that either reinforce or disrupt synchronous firing?
If computational experiments, using biologically realistic parameter settings, demonstrated that different "attention density settings" produced clearly distinguishable differences in synchronicity, such a result would lend support to the model presented here for efficacious conscious choice. Eventually, such a mathematical model and simulation might point the way to in vivo experiments to test the theory of mind-body interaction.
Conclusion
This paper reviewed a theory for the physical basis of efficacious free choice and discussed a path toward empirically evaluating the theory. The theory is entirely consistent with existing physical theory, but does not explain free choice solely in terms of existing physical primitives. Rather, the theory fills the incompleteness in quantum theory by postulating a new ontological category, the reducing agent, that interacts with the physical world by initiating reductions to some part of its state. The choices of reducing agents are causal in the sense of Pearl's structural theory of causation. A reducing agent can choose among multiple different physically allowable sequences of reductions, and these choices have observable consequences in the physical world. Humans are hypothesized to be one, although not necessarily the only, kind of reducing agent. Human free will is hypothesized to operate through attention density, defined as the application of rapid sequences of reductions in the brain. The brain unconsciously and automatically generates templates for action, and an attention density setting is chosen to hold a desired action template in place or to disrupt execution of an undesirable action template.
A fundamental requirement of the scientific method is that theories must be subjected to empirical test. To test the theory presented here, a concrete instantiation is needed of the general hypothesis that free will operates via attention density. Although many details remain to be worked out, the general outline of such a concrete instantiation was given in Section 7. The specific mechanism involves a feedback loop in which activity in the brain's neural network generates an electric field, which in turn entrains synchronous oscillations in the brain's neural network. Quantum uncertainty enters via calcium ion channels in the brain's nerve terminals. Focused attention is hypothesized to result in rapid self-measurement of the brain state, employing the quantum Zeno effect within the brain to reinforce or disrupt entrainment of synchronous oscillations according to the intention of the organism.
A simulation of this model is proposed as a means to examine the hypothesized effects of focused attention. Such a simulation could support investigation of whether, using biologically realistic parameter settings, the hypothesized mechanism can produce macroscopic effects on the behavior of the neural network, thereby providing insight into the plausibility of the theory and pointing the way to empirical studies.
